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The international community has designated 1996 
as the year for the eradication of poverty. This is a 
tough challenge. What is achievable is an increased 
understanding of the complexity behind such a 
challenge. (UNICEF 1996) 
Introduction 
The most significant issues facing African states in the late 
twentieth century relate to the environment of poverty, 
scarcity and inequality in which the vast majority of their 
peoples live. The World Bank has called the deterioration 
of economic, social and human conditions across the 
continent since the 1970s 'the greatest sustained 
development failure of the century'.' The 1980s undoubtedly 
made the African continent the poorest region in the world, 
where the short term future is of a further increase in the' 
number of people living in absolute poverty by the year 2000. 
On this basis, as the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) pointed out in its 1995 review of 
Australian aid to Africa, 'by 2010 the majority of those living 
in absolute poverty in the world will be living on the African 
continent' .2 
The failure of current development strategies to halt this 
process of impoverishment, at a time- the mid-1990s- when 
the international community has reaffirmed its commitment 
to poverty eradication as a central objective of development 
assistance,' suggests we may not yet have properly 
understood the causes of poverty itself. The year- 1996-
designated by the international community for the 
eradication of poverty is perhaps an appropriate time to 
return to this question. 
Contemporary African poverty is now an important area of 
research.• Some of the agreed causes of contemporary 
poverty, and the increased immiserisation oflarge sections 
of African society in the 1990s, include: the violence of 
internal conflict; natural disasters, and especially the great 
droughts of the last 25 years; the enormous movements of 
populations who have fled war and drought; and the 
increasing pressures of population on scarce and depleted 
resources. Addressing these problems is seen as the first 
step back from such human catastrophes. 
In contrast, there is no genuine consensus as to the causes 
of poverty arising out of what The Economist calls the 
'dismal trend' downwards which, at the end of the 1980s, 
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had left the great majority of Africans poorer than they had 
been in 1965.' This lack of consensus emerges from the 
contemporary debate on the narrower question of the (causes 
of) the African economic crisis itself and the strategies 
adopted forrecovery. That debate offers useful insights into 
the prevailing notions across the international community 
of the causes of African poverty. It began with the 
publication of the World Bank's 1981 Report, Accelerated 
development in sub-Saharan Africa,• and has been directed 
in essence towards the structural adjustment programmes 
which have been laid down by the international community 
as the necessary solution to the economic crisis and the 
political liberalism that provided 'the basic doctrine of the 
Report' .7 Through the 1980s, the resulting dialogue focused 
largely but by no means exclusively on the economics of 
recovery and has maintained strong ideological undertones.• 
African governments have themselves been powerful (if not 
often effective) critics of Bank prescriptions, proposing 
alternative strategies! By the end of the 1980s, however, 
most governments had accepted the necessity for, and had 
adopted, adjustment programmes; although many it seems 
have not always implemented them to the extent required 
by donors.•• In the mid-1990s popular opinion across Africa 
undoubtedly continued to attribute the decline in material 
standards of living to structural adjustment and the debate 
was far from closed." 
The parameters of this debate were broadened in 1989 by 
the publication of the World Bank's Report, Sub-Saharan 
Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth. 12 Described by 
Richard Sandbrook as 'seminal' and an 'exceptionally clear 
and authoritative account of the ascendant, liberal-
democratic, free enterprise model for Africa's recovery' 13 
the 1989 Report shifted attention to what is now termed 
'governance', and to the need for political and administrative 
reforms to facilitate economic recovery. It was concerned 
with human rights and justice, and multi-party electoral 
systems as well as administrative reform, and reflected a 
firm ideological commitment to liberal democracy. 'Good 
government' in this process created, in Mick Moore's words, 
'a new orthodoxy that is likely to be with us for the 
foreseeable future' .•• Reflecting the changed ideological 
environment of the post-cold war world, the emphasis on 
pluralism incorporated into the dialogue questions about the 
relationship between democracy and development. 15 
The preoccupation of the Bank's 'adjustment and good 
government' approach to the African crisis has been with 
economic decline and recovery. Poverty is seen as the 
consequence of that economic decline. 'Reducing poverty 
... the most important goal of development, is particularly 
difficult in sub-Saharan Africa because of slow economic 
growth, rapid population growth and a fragile resource 
base'.'' The key to the eradication of poverty is therefore 
seen to lie in economic growth. Some changes of approach 
have in fact occurred; as Green and Faber point out, it is 
short-sighted to 'see the World Bank and IMF as monolithic 
in approach' or to ignore the dynamics of their own policy 
process.'7 Recognition of the fundamental importance of 
'safety nets' for the poor, for example, was won by the 
campaign for 'adjustment with a human face' initiated by 
UNICEF which forced attention to the poverty consequences 
of government cuts in health, education and agricultural 
services, in already fragile economies.'• 
The 1990 World Development Report on poverty recognises 
the need for a 'comprehensive approach to poverty reduction' 
which combines 'well-targeted transfers and safety nets' with 
the basic strategy to 'promote productive use of the labour 
of the poor and provide basic social services for them' .19 
Nevertheless the Report concludes that 'Attacking poverty 
... is a task for economic policy in the large' and continues 
to give primacy to economic growth. 20 Moreover, the causes 
of poverty are seen to be economic and linked to the past 
economic policies of the post-colonial African states, albeit 
combined with adverse changes in the international economy. 
A review of Australian aid to Africa summed up the position 
simply as 'internal policy mistakes and adverse external 
developments [which] combined to produce the 
deterioration. ' 21 This emphasis also appears in the analyses 
of poverty itself. Thus the World Bank's 1994 Zambia 
poverty assessment begins with the statement: 'The poverty 
crisis in Zambia is a result of longstanding inappropriate 
policies compounded by severe external shocks.' 22 The 
Poverty assessment for Kenya asserts: 'The lack of sustained 
economic growth is the primary cause of continued income 
poverty in Kenya' .n 
It is with this interpretation of the causes of and the cure for 
poverty that this paper is concerned. 
The causes of African poverty: Economics is not 
enough 
No one would dispute the importance of the impact of 
economic decline experienced across Africa through the 
1970s and 1980s on the well-being of the African peoples. 
Nevertheless there are several reasons for questioning 
whether this is a sufficient explanation of poverty in the 
1990s. Poverty associated with physical want has a long 
history in the pre-colonial as well as colonial eras. Moreover 
there is considerable evidence that structural poverty has 
been a cumulative phenomenon in the twentieth century; a 
trend that flowed on into the independent stateY The World 
Bank's Zambia poverty assessment refers to two kinds of 
poverty: permanent and temporary.25 Ghai and Alcantara 
remind us of the impact of the great depression of the 1930s.2' 
Bequelle and van der Hoeven pointed in 1980 to the extent 
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to which 'the better off and more powerful groups are in a 
better position to pass on their acquired wealth and status to 
their children', whereas 'the poor ... find it increasingly 
difficult to overcome their poverty and even worse are 
compelled to transmit it to their children' .27 In this context 
Ghai and Alcantara's argument becomes all the more 
significant: 
although it is customary in much of the literature on 
the 'social impact of adjustment' to view the process 
of adaptation as a temporary phenomenon -
interrupting a single, lineal process of modernisation 
which should resume its normal course once current 
difficulties are overcome- such an assumption should 
be subject to considerable scrutiny.28 
Such scrutiny requires that we situate the changes over the 
past 20 years in the context of the globalisation with which 
the African economic crisis has coincided. Global 
integration sine~ the 1960s appears quite clearly to have 
intensified poverty as well as inequality, and to have 
increased the rich-poor gap within as well as between 
countries (and not only in Africa).29 Furthermore, the new 
levels of scarcity are a consequence not only of past mistakes 
but of current reforms, as recognition of the need for safety 
nets acknowledges. 
We need also to understand that the roots of poverty lie 
deeper in the past than is frequently acknowledged. The 
1972 ILO report on employment, incomes and equality in 
Kenya, one of the most influential of the reports linked to 
the ILO's World Employment Programme, located the origins 
of the unemployment and gross inequality of the late 1960s 
in the colonial years.30 Similarly the stagnation in agricultural 
. production which has been central to the larger economic 
crisis has its roots in colonial agrarian change and the model 
of agricultural modernisation that provided the basis of the 
commercialisation of agriculture after the second world war. 
Peasant society became locked into 'modern agricultural 
systems' as commodity production in the 1950s boomed. 
Agricultural modernisation bypassed the poorest peasant 
households, however, and rural differentiation and 
inequalities increased. Changing modes of production 
resulted in changing social relations, and thus the social 
processes reproducing poverty." The consequences in terms 
of environmental change and unsustainable agriculture are 
also now well known. Much of the explanation of current 
ecological crisis focuses on population pressures and these 
have undoubtedly been critical. Nevertheless the mode of 
agricultural production has itself been fundamental to 
environmental degradation. The pre-capitalist (traditional) 
cultivator sought to adapt to nature and to grow a wide variety 
of crops to reduce risk. Modern large-scale agriculture seeks 
to control the environment and to grow a few crops. The 
outcome over the past 50 or more years has been the loss of 
diversity and the steady erosion of the land in a great many 
parts of a very diverse continent.32 This makes the continuity 
of agricultural policy between the colonial and post-colonial 
state a critical issue. 
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In a continent whose soils are poor and the vast majority of 
the inhabitants small farmers or herders, land has always been 
crucial for livelihoods. The transition from a land-rich to a 
land-poor continent has thus been crucial to the process 
whereby poverty has grown. Iliffe argues that 'land scarcity 
was slow to breed extreme poverty because many of the 
landless could sell their labour as wages that at least ensured 
subsistence'." By the 1990s, Rwanda had nevertheless 
demonstrated the implosion that may follow where people 
lack both land and an escape route to an alternative means 
of survival. Population pressures have undoubtedly been 
significant in changing the balance between the land and its 
human and animal inhabitants. More fundamental have been 
the changes in land use and land tenure, especially in the 
fertile arable areas, which have reduced access to the poorest 
levels of society.,. 
Questions about land are questions about resource use and 
the uneven access to productive resources that lie at the heart 
of the contemporary crisis of livelihoods. The allocation 
and use of resources is a matter of policy, so it is significant 
that structural adjustment strategies at the macro-level have 
been concerned with trade liberalisation and privatisation, 
with 'leaner government' rather than with a direct attack on 
poverty itself, and with creating an environment that will 
encourage foreign investment rather than empower the poor. 
While social impact programmes have been introduced, they 
receive fewer resources than support for private sector 
expansion. In the process the same privileged levels of 
society that benefited from the state in the past continue to 
do so. Policy is predicated on the same notions of 
development and modernisation that Ghai and Alcantara find 
wanting, and on the model which Colin Leys located as the 
root of inequality 25 years ago." 
Policy, as the OECD points out, is 'basically a political 
issue' .36 We need therefore to situate any inquiry into poverty 
in its political context and to explore the relationship between 
poverty and power. Iliffe's discussion of poverty raises the 
question as to whether numerous Africans in precolonial 
Rwanda were not impoverished by their lack of political 
power.37 Looking back at the changing landscape in Siaya, 
Western Kenya over the past century, Cohen and Atieno 
Odhiambo comment on 'the extent to which the image of 
tropical abundance in the past rested not on nature but on 
prevalent political conditions' .38 Amartya Sen's entitlements 
approach to famine, where 'entitlements systems are beliefs 
created in political practice about who ought to get what 
and under what circumstances', makes the same point.•• 
In the context of current notions of good governance, this 
means focusing on the shift away from the one-party state 
with the sequence of multi-party elections between 1989 
and 1992 on the one hand,40 and on the issue of donor 
dominance and conditionality on the other. 
The wave of elections that heralded the 1990s ultimately 
reflected the dissatisfaction of ordinary Africans with those 
in power and, as Beckman has pointed out, enabled groups 
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to build alliances across class divisions and 'made possible 
a new popular base'!' Competitive party politics ought to 
enable the poor who constitute the majority to influence 
policy outcomes. Not everyone agreed on a necessary 
relationship between multi-partyism and economic recovery, 
however. Uganda's President Museveni, as outgoing 
Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 
1991, argued that 'the Western multi-party systems were a 
result of prosperity not the cause', and that 'some in Africa 
think that if we have multi-parties we will have prosperity, 
this is putting the cart before the horse' ! 2 Five years later he 
seemed to have been proved correct. As African states 
embarked on what was called 'round two of pluralism'•• 
multi-party elections had made little difference to the material 
well-being of the great majority of Africans who, four years 
earlier, had voted their old leaders out of power. In Zambia, 
for example, where in 1991 electors had swept President 
Kaunda from power after some 23 years in office, in 1996, 
67 per cent of the population lived in 'households with 
expenditures per adult equivalent below a level to provide 
basic needs'. 44 Nine out of the ten southern African states had 
elections in the first half of the 1990s without any significant 
impact on either economic recovery or reduction of poverty. 
Elections by themselves from this perspective have proved 
an insufficient base for shifting resources to the poor. 
Policies on poverty eradication have been influenced in the 
1990s less by electoral fortunes than by the international 
community of donors. The 1980s left African governments 
more dependent than ever before on a not always enthusiastic 
international community for assistance to tackle the long-
term task of reconstruction as well as the immediate crisis. 
While African governments have challenged the package of 
economic reforms imposed upon them in the name of 
structural adjustment, there is little doubt that most of them 
had lost control of their policy making process by the end of 
the 1980s, as shown by Zambia's short-lived attempt to follow 
her own independent programme from 1~87 to 1989.45 
Political conditionality moreover opens the way to what 
Martin Doornbos sees as 'an increasingly explicit tutelage 
relation with the countries concerned' .46 The policy dialogue 
is therefore conducted between governments, and therefore 
bureaucrats, rather than between politicians, parties and 
people. Accountability in this environment is not to the 
electorate but to the donor community. Moreover, in the 
post-cold war world the neo-liberal hegemony has meant 
that debate on the model of development itself has been 
foreclosed.· It is difficult to see bureaucracies, themselves 
under threat, being able or perhaps willing to reopen it. 
What is to be done? The need to think politically within 
an historical perspective 
What is required for a better understanding of poverty in 
Africa at the end of twentieth century is, as David 
Goldsworthy urged us to do some years ago, to think (more) 
politically.47 We need to focus on the 'questions of the 
exercise of power' about which Goetz and O'Brien conclude 
the World Bank is silent. This means focusing our analysis 
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on the social processes that reproduce poverty that are 
ignored by the current orthodoxy. We need to think politically 
about contemporary Africa as it becomes not only more 
'capitalist' but also more poverty-ridden and more unequal.48 
In the process we need also to confront the ideological 
underpinnings of neo-liberal thinking about development in 
the post-cold war, pluralist world. 
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